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Abstract: This comment discusses Kaidesoja (2013) and raises the issue whether 
his analysis justifies stronger conclusions than he presents in the book. My com-
ments focus on four issues. First, I argue that his naturalistic reconstruction of 
critical realist transcendental arguments shows that transcendental arguments 
should be treated as a rare curiosity rather than a general argumentative strategy. 
Second, I suggest that Kaidesoja’s analysis does not really justify his optimism 
about the usefulness of causal powers ontology in the social sciences. Third, I 
raise some doubts about the heuristic value of Mario Bunge’s social ontology 
that Kaidesoja presents as a replacement for critical realist ontology. Finally, I 
propose an alternative way to analyze failures of aggregativity that might better 
serve Kaidesoja’s purposes than the Wimsattian scheme he employs in the book.
Keywords: Critical realism; Transcendental argument; Causal power; Emergence; 
Social ontology.
The critical realism movement has been remarkably influential in the social 
sciences, especially when it is contrasted with the rather limited impact of the 
mainstream philosophers of science. It seems that critical realism has been able 
to provide a brand and a philosophical package that has resonated with social 
scientists. The core ideas of critical realism appear to be close to the scientific 
common sense: realism, causal powers, and the idea of mechanism-based expla-
nation. Thus it has provided a natural alternative to various “postmodernist” 
positions that have been highly visible over last three decades. Further, the fact 
that many of the prominent critical realist have been social scientists themselves 
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have made it more acceptable. While social scientists are often quite willing to 
borrow the authority of some well-known philosophers, they do not like to be 
preached to by analytical philosophers who seem to be more home with humani-
ties and natural sciences, rather than the social sciences proper.
However, from the point of view of present day philosophy of science, criti-
cal realism seems to have some worrisome features. When the movement was 
emerging in the seventies, it adopted and incorporated much of the up-to-date 
philosophy of science especially from the work of Rom Harré (Harré 1970; Harré 
and Madden 1975). However, since then the movement seems to have become 
quite insulated from developments in philosophy of science. Consequently, the 
present-day critical realism seems to be a mix of some half-developed, but possi-
bly valid, ideas and some highly obscure elements. This situation makes Tuukka 
Kaidesoja’s book highly relevant. His attempt to naturalize critical realism opens 
new debates between critical realism and the more mainstream philosophy of 
science. Even more importantly, it introduces to the philosophically oriented 
social scientists many philosophers who have been mostly working in the con-
fines of philosophy.
In the following, I will present some critical comments on Naturalizing Critical 
Realist Social Ontology. My comments are not so much criticisms of the presented 
arguments, but rather questions about the overall implications of the book. I will 
start with a question about the role of transcendental arguments in social ontol-
ogy, then proceed to the fruitfulness of ontology of causal powers and finish with 
some worries about Bungean ontology and emergence.
1  Reconstructing Transcendental Arguments
One of the main contributions of the book is Kaidesoja’s demystification of the 
abundant transcendental argumentation in critical realism in chapter 4. Since 
Bhaskar’s first book, transcendental arguments have been a characteristic 
feature of critical realism. In fact, it is often presented as a feature that sets it 
apart from mainstream philosophy. However, the nature and scope of these argu-
ments has always remained a bit obscure and the individual arguments rather 
sketchy. Kaidesoja’s discussion is extremely useful for anyone interested in tran-
scendental arguments presented by critical realists. He basically argues that the 
only reasonable way to reconstruct the realist ontological arguments is to regard 
them as inferences to the best explanation rather than a special kind of transcen-
dental arguments. In these naturalistic ontological arguments both the premises 
and conclusions are fallible.
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While I share the naturalistic spirit of Kaidesoja’s approach, I have my doubts 
about his proposed replacement for the transcendental arguments. He suggests 
that the general form for justifying naturalistic critical realist arguments is the 
following:
1. X is an epistemically successful scientific practice described on the basis of 
empirical analysis of the practice.
2. It is hypothetically (and in the explanatory sense) a necessary condition of 
the epistemic successfulness of practice X under description that the onto-
logical structure of the world (or some of its aspects) really is as described in 
propositions P1, … Pn.
3. Propositions P1, … Pn are compatible with the ontological commitments of 
current scientific theories which have stood the test of critical evaluation by 
the relevant scientific community.
4. The explicit ontological propositions or implicit ontological presupposi-
tions of competing philosophical positions, say Q1, … Qn are incompatible 
with propositions P1, … Pn and the epistemic successfulness of X under our 
description remains impossible or unintelligible from the point of view of 
Q1, … Qn.
5. The best explanation of the epistemic successfulness of practice X under our 
description currently is that (a certain aspect or region of) the world is as 
described in propositions P1, … Pn.
I think this structure is similar enough to transcendental arguments found in 
the critical realist literature to be called a naturalistic replacement for them. 
Here I am in agreement with Kaidesoja. Our bone of contention is the relevance 
and usability of this scheme. I am not worried about the first premise, or the 
explanandum, of the argument. While it is indeed rather restricted as an object 
of ontological inquiry, it can easily be replaced with something more general. 
The issue is really with the combined effect of the premises 2, 3, and 4. The 
crucial one is the premise 4. It basically states that all competing philosophi-
cal positions are incompatible with the suggested candidate and they cannot 
adequately make sense of the phenomenon in question. So, this is not an infer-
ence to the best explanation, rather this is inference to the only (philosophical) 
explanation.
Are we ever in a situation where we have only one viable philosophical inter-
pretation of some phenomenon? I would like to suggest that this happens only 
when we have somehow arbitrarily restricted the number of available positions. 
This might in fact be the case with many transcendental arguments presented by 
critical realists. The plurality of viable philosophical interpretations has at least 
two sources. First, philosophers actually have quite diverse conceptions of what 
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counts as an adequate philosophical analysis/explanation of some practice (the 
premise 2). Thus, any attempt to argue for the premise 4 would be essentially con-
tested and controversial. Second – and this is the reason why the premise 3 does 
not much constraint the set of available positions – in the case of philosophical 
views there appears to be something analogical to the empirical underdetermina-
tion of scientific theories. No matter how detailed an account of a phenomenon 
one gives, there always appears to be more than one ontological scheme than can 
accommodate it. Thus it might be that while there are some ontological positions 
that leave the phenomenon unintelligible, there will always be other positions 
that can (philosophically) save it. Thus, in fact, one is never in position to run the 
argument as it is reconstructed by Kaidesoja.
Now this sketchy argument should not taken as a proof of impossibility, but I 
think it can be used to raise some worries about the relevance of the transcenden-
tal line of argumentation in ontology, even when it is reconstructed naturalisti-
cally. Transcendental arguments in ontology are an occasional curiosity rather 
than a basis for a special philosophical methodology. If this is the case, then it 
might be wiser to drop the whole transcendental line of argumentation than to 
attempt to reconstruct it (naturalistically or otherwise). I do not know how great 
the actual disagreement between me and Kaidesoja is on this issue, but his book 
does leave the impression that naturalistically reconstructed transcendental 
arguments still have some promise and to my mind this impression is misleading. 
In ontology, you can always expect that you can show a range of possible posi-
tions untenable, but it is wishful thinking to show that some position the only 
viable one. Thus, arguments of this kind will be very rare.
2  The Ontology of Causal Powers
In chapter 5 Kaidesoja provides a comprehensive discussion of the notion of 
causal power as it has been used in critical realism. He shows both how Rom 
Harré created the foundation for the critical realist discussion of causal powers 
and how these views were modified later both by Harré and critical realists. 
Kaidesoja’s discussion is illuminating and it clearly demonstrates what kind of 
conceptual problems were created when the notion of a causal power (and asso-
ciated notions like essence, intrinsic nature, and natural necessity) were trans-
ported to psychological and social realms.
However, I did not find his reconstruction of Bhaskar’s views in A Realist 
Theory of Science (1975) entirely convincing. Kaidesoja suggests that Bhaskar 
regards causal powers (and/or mechanisms) as abstract universals. To my mind, 
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most quotations he provides on page 119 do not actually support this interpreta-
tion. Kaidesoja seems to miss the crucial distinction between the activity of a causal 
power and the display of that power in observable events. The notion of tendency 
Bhaskar utilizes is quite directly borrowed from J. S. Mill’s A System of Logic (2002, 
book III, chapter 10, §5) There Mill considers causes analogical to physical forces 
and presents the notion of composition of causes. In this view, the causal laws, in 
Bhaskar’s terminology claims about causal powers, are universal although they are 
not always observable in empirical regularities. This is so because the full realiza-
tion of the power can be prevented by countervailing causes. The key point is that 
this view does not imply in any way that causal powers are abstract universals. Of 
course, this is not to say that Bhaskar’s position is without problems. He talks about 
causal powers and mechanisms quite loosely and does not seem to make any dis-
tinction between these terms. Furthermore, and more substantially, it is really an 
open question how far one can take the analogy between physical forces and causal 
powers. It seems to me that any serious attempt to use these ideas to reconstruct 
causal thinking in the social sciences would have very limited applicability.
My more general concern is with the implications of Kaidesoja’s discussion 
of causal powers. I think he successfully shows that employment of the causal 
powers ontology to the philosophy of mind and social ontology has been trou-
blesome since the beginning. It seems that none of the alternatives suggested in 
the critical realist literature is really successful. Still, Kaidesoja is hopeful that the 
approach can be saved by giving it a proper naturalistic foundation. To me, the first 
question would be is it really worth the trouble? Does the causal powers perspec-
tive really provide some crucial methodological advantages for the social sciences, 
in other words, does it actually help in making sense of causal attributions, infer-
ences and explanations in the social sciences? I think it is far from obvious that the 
answer is positive, especially if the causal powers theory is contrasted with some 
recent theories of causation (see for example, Woodward 2003). Notice that this 
stance is not based on any kind of skepticism about causal powers. Causal powers 
– that is dispositional properties – are regarded as fully legitimate entities for most 
philosophers. Furthermore, capacities and dispositions are important explananda 
in the sciences (Ylikoski 2013). It is just that notion of power does not seem to be 
that productive in understanding causal reasoning in the social sciences.
3  Bungean Social Ontology
One of Kaidesoja’s core suggestions in the book is the idea that Mario Bunge’s 
ontology of social systems provides a good foundation for naturalistically oriented 
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critical realist ontology. By adopting the Bungean ontology, Kaidesoja can dispense 
with many problematic features of traditional critical realism: no longer any need 
for transcendental arguments, essences, natures, or internal relations. Bunge pro-
vides a consistent but highly abstract scheme for analyzing everything into compo-
sition, environment, structure and mechanisms. I do not have any problems with 
these notions. However, I wonder what the status of this abstract ontological theory 
is, and more concretely, how does it interact with substantial social scientific theo-
ries. This question is important, because the close interaction between ontology 
and scientific theory is a key feature of naturalism as Kaidesoja describes it.
One possibility is that social scientists accept Bunge’s philosophy as a whole. 
This would imply that they would also accept Bunge’s analysis of power, Bunge’s 
theories of social classes, and social status that are all discussed by Kaidesoja 
(pp. 154–159). I do not think this would count as a very credible version of natu-
ralism. Rather this kind of a priori theorizing has similarities to critical realism 
at its worst. The other alternative is that social scientists merely accept Bunge’s 
abstract and flexible systems vocabulary and continue their work as usual. In this 
case, Bunge’s own substantial social theory would be a mere demonstration that 
it is possible to have a consistent social ontology. However, the problem with this 
approach is that it is an open question how much the mere systems vocabulary 
would contribute to social scientific theorizing. It might just be too abstract to do 
real work in theoretical systematization. Similarly, it is not clear that it would be 
very useful in dissolving real ontological problems in social ontology. Thus, I am 
inclined to withhold my judgment on Bunge’s social ontology until some fruitful 
applications of it are produced.
4  How to Study Emergence
Kaidesoja characterizes his position as a science-oriented version of the emergent 
materialist ontology (p. 14). He contrasts this position to eliminative materialism that 
does not seem to provide promising bases for a philosophy of social sciences. I think 
he greatly clarifies critical realist discussions about emergence. He argues that there 
are at least three notions of emergence found in the critical realists literature, and 
two of these – transcendentally realist and global-level concepts of emergent powers 
– should be discarded as inherently problematic. This leaves only the compositional 
concept of emergent power, for which Kaidesoja suggests a Bungean analysis accord-
ing to which a property is emergent if the constituents of the object having it do not 
possess it. In other words, emergent properties are ontologically novel properties.
To this both safe and weak notion of compositional emergence, Kaidesoja 
combines Wimsatt’s (2007) idea of failure of aggregativity. This is a smart move. 
Brought to you by | Linköping University Library
Authenticated
Download Date | 11/11/15 8:55 AM
Comment on Naturalizing Critical Realist Social Ontology      339
While Bunge’s notion of emergence can be criticized for trivializing the idea of 
emergence – according to it most mundane properties are emergent – Wimsatt’s 
perspective turns this into a positive research strategy. The requirements for 
aggregativity are quite strict, but it makes sense to ask how the aggregativity fails. 
According to Wimsatt, aggregativity has four dimensions: (i) intersubstition of 
parts, (ii) size scaling under addition and substraction of parts, (iii) decompo-
sition and reaggregation of the parts, and (iv) linearity of interactions between 
parts. As Kaidesoja notes, this scheme makes it possible to study empirically the 
failures of aggregativity also in a social system, thus turning a philosophical prob-
lems to a scientifically tractable problem. I really like the spirit of this idea, and 
look forward for detailed applications of Wimsatt’s scheme to problems in social 
ontology. However, it might be that there are some problems with the scheme 
(Kuorikoski and Ylikoski 2013, pp. 73–74). First, the conditions seem to conflate 
properties of representations and properties of the represented system. Second, 
the failures are more akin to symptoms of the role of organization in composi-
tion rather than an analysis of it. The conditions do list different types of cases 
in which we cannot simply aggregate the whole from its parts, but they do not 
explicate why this is impossible. What we need is a more general and analytically 
fruitful way of conceiving organization as an explanatory variable. An alternative 
is to focus on dimensions of organizational dependence (Kuorikoski and Ylikoski 
2013, pp. 74–75). While this suggestion is still in the same sprit as Wimsatt’s, it 
might have an advantage of providing more consistent and systematic approach 
for understanding failures of aggregation.
5  Conclusion
Naturalizing Critical Realist Social Ontology is an important contribution both to 
the debates about critical realism and to the philosophy of the social sciences in 
general. As my comments show, I am mostly in agreement with Kaidesoja. However, 
I have raised some issues related to the overall implications of his arguments. It 
seems that stronger conclusions about transcendental arguments, causal powers 
and critical realist social ontology are warranted than are presented in his book.
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